The impact of long-term aircraft carrier maintenance scheduling on the Fleet Readiness Plan by Hall, Matthew H.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2004-09
The impact of long-term aircraft carrier maintenance
scheduling on the Fleet Readiness Plan
Hall, Matthew H.














THE IMPACT OF LONG-TERM AIRCRAFT 
CARRIER MAINTENANCE SCHEDULING  








Thesis Advisor: W. Matthew Carlyle 
Second Reader: Jeffrey E. Kline 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
September 2004 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Impact of Long-Term Aircraft Carrier 
Maintenance Scheduling on the Fleet Readiness Plan 
6. AUTHOR(S) Matthew H. Hall 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
Maintaining the Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP) construct of six aircraft carriers available within 30 days, plus two 
additional carriers available within 90 days is a difficult task. Maintenance requirements on carriers alone make 
satisfying the FRP a challenging scheduling problem.  We develop a carrier maintenance scheduling model with a 
goal to meet, as best as possible, the FRP requirements over a ten-year period, while obeying simple maintenance 
facility constraints.  This model allows us to anticipate gaps in coverage and also quantitatively assess the benefit, 
or burden, of re-sizing the fleet. We conclude that by increasing the average cycle time for a Carrier Strike Group 
(CSG) to 27 months we can meet the FRP requirements continuously after an initial maintenance adjustment 
period of 62 months. 
 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
87 
14. SUBJECT TERMS: Aircraft Carrier Strike Group (CSG), Depot-Level Maintenance Scheduling, 
Optimization, Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP), Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP), “6+2” Construct, 
and Column Generation. 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF LONG-TERM AIRCRAFT CARRIER MAINTENANCE 
SCHEDULING ON THE FLEET READINESS PLAN 
 
Matthew H. Hall 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Author:  Matthew H. Hall 
 
 








 James N. Eagle 




























Maintaining the Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP) construct of six aircraft carriers 
available within 30 days, plus two additional carriers available within 90 days is a 
difficult task. Maintenance requirements on carriers alone make satisfying the FRP a 
challenging scheduling problem.  We develop a carrier maintenance scheduling model 
with a goal to meet, as best as possible, the FRP requirements over a ten-year period, 
while obeying simple maintenance facility constraints.  This model allows us to 
anticipate gaps in coverage and also quantitatively assess the benefit, or burden, of re-
sizing the fleet. We conclude that by increasing the average cycle time for a Carrier 
Strike Group (CSG) to 27 months we can meet the FRP requirements continuously after 
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The end of the Cold War and the consequent absence of a single, predictable 
adversary has forced policy makers to consider the manner in which our Naval Forces 
train, maintain and deploy. Recent increases in force demands for Iraq and the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) require that our forces be deployed in a manner that supports the 
National Military Strategy (NMS) and maximizes the effective employment of our troop 
presence and combat power.  Deterrence strategies driven by continuous carrier forward 
presence have given way to response strategies that require Naval Forces to potentially 
surge to multiple conflicts throughout many different regions of the world. 
The transition to a response based focus is realized in the 2003 Naval Operating 
Concept for Joint Operations (NOC). This concept demands the joint capability to defend 
the homeland, deter aggression in four critical areas and swiftly defeat the effort (SDTE) 
in two overlapping wars with the ability to defeat one of the aforementioned adversaries 
decisively. [Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, 2003]  
To meet the NOC requirements, the Navy has developed the Fleet Readiness Plan 
(FRP) and the Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) construct.   The FRP and FRTP are 
built upon a series of progressive readiness states that are designed to provide a highly 
responsive, sustainable force that has the ability to reconstitute and deploy rapidly.  
Specifically, FRP requires the capability to provide six aircraft carriers within 30 days of 
a crisis and an additional two carriers within 90 days of that same crisis.  
This thesis discusses the personnel preparedness and maintenance factors that 
constrain the carrier force’s ability to support these force requirements and concentrates 
on the affect of depot-level maintenance on the Carrier Strike Group’s (CSG) 
employment under the FRP construct.    
 xv
We initially investigate two 24-month training schedules in which the period for 
employment, that time in which a combatant is able but is not required to deploy, is varied 
between three and 18 months. We then explore two 27-month training schedules wherein 
the employment period is varied between three and 21 months.  Under each of these 
training schedules, we model three unique scenarios.  The first scenario is the baseline 
scenario, which models the ability of the current 12 carrier force structure to meet the 
FRP force requirements.  The second scenario, the loss scenario, models the affect on 
FRP of losing an Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) CSG and the third scenario, the gain 
scenario, models the affect on FRP of gaining a LANTFLT CSG.  Additionally, we 
investigate the affect of gaining a dry-dock facility and dropping the “6+2” requirement 
to “5+2.” The scenarios begin in August 2004, end in July 2013, and follow the aggregate 
carrier maintenance schedule of 12 May 2004 provided by the NAVSEA maintenance 
office.  
The results of this analysis show that if one lengthens the duration of time an 
aircraft carrier is available for employment to 15 months, the percentage of time one can 
meet the “6+2” requirement increases. Under the “6 to 21” 15-month employable (D) 
state training plan, “6+2”can be met, undeniably, by October 2009. 
If one lengthens the duration of time an aircraft carrier is available for 
employment to 15 months and in addition, decreases the FRP requirement to “5+2,” the 
current force structure can meet this goal, unquestionably, by February 2007. The benefit 
of this analysis is that we quantify the affects of potential policy changes and weigh the 
advantages and disadvantages of each. 
 xvi
I. INTRODUCTION    
A. BACKGROUND  
Scheduling ships’ maintenance and training cycles to meet operational 
commitments is a complex decision making process that demands efficient planning and 
execution. The fundamental problem is how to allocate a scarce resource, in this case 
Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), in a manner that maximizes their deployment availability 
or “surge” readiness. Specifically, this entails the Carrier Strike Group’s ability to meet 
Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP) demands under the operational and material constraints of 
depot-level maintenance.  Current scheduling tools range from manual enumeration to the 
use of the Program Evaluation and Review Techniques (PERT) or Critical Path Method 
(CPM) applications.  This thesis provides a quantitative analysis of the scheduling impact 
of waterfront time constraints, training objectives and material preparedness, on the FRP.  
Additionally, it provides Type Commanders (TYCOMs) and Fleet Commanders 
(C2F/C3F) with a responsive scheduling tool that will enable them to enumerate various 
scheduling possibilities and the effects these possibilities impart on asset availability and 
assured readiness.   
 
1. Navy Deployment Strategy 
Since the United States Navy’s founding on October 13, 1775, the deployment 
strategies used to employ our naval forces have changed a number of times.  The 
employment goal, however, has remained much the same, “power projection ashore as 
well as sea control.” [Swartz, 2002]  Although the size of the Navy has grown from two 
armed sailing vessels to today’s figure of approximately 300 surface combatants, the 
Navy’s responsibilities have grown from the thirteen colonies’ coastlines to the waters of 
the entire globe.   
A single deployment strategy has not prevailed throughout U.S. naval history. As 
domestic and international issues have changed, the Navy has adapted to meet its 
commitments.  Consequently, whereas the Navy of the late eighteenth century deployed  
1
from ports along the Atlantic coast, today’s Navy has the ability to surge from ports 
worldwide.  Integrated U.S. force operations were not the norm prior to WWII, but such 
operations are now the key to any successful mission.     
Currently, American forces are widely dispersed throughout five operational 
Areas of Responsibility (AORs) in over 140 different countries across the globe. [Buzby, 
2004]  As illustrated in Figure 1, the Navy maintains forward presence on a near 
continual basis in three of these AORs: the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), the 
U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and the U.S. European Command 
(USEUCOM).  With recent increases in force demands for Iraq and the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT), it is paramount our forces be deployed in a manner that supports the 
National Military Strategy (NMS) and maximizes the effective employment of our troop 
presence and combat power.   
 
Figure 1.    The Unified Command Plan establishes the missions and geographic 
responsibilities among the combatant commanders.  The five Unified 
Commands are USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, USPACOM, 
USCENTCOM and USEUCOM. [Unified Command Plan, 2004] 
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2. Carrier Strike Group (CSG) 
The U.S. Navy’s Carrier Strike Group (CSG) remains the primary military 
instrument for maintaining global forward presence and conducting national security 
strategy.  At the heart of the CSG lie the conventional or nuclear powered aircraft carrier 
(CV/CVN) and its associated carrier air wing (CVW). In addition to their force structure, 
the training and maintenance cycles of the CVs/CVNs and CVWs limit the number of 
CSGs available for employment and, as such, are the focus of this analysis. 
As presently configured and shown in Tables 1 and 2, there are 10 CVNs, 2 CVs, 
10 CVWs and 1 Naval Reserve Air-wing (CVWR).   
 
Hull #
USS KITTY HAWK CV 63
USS ENTERPRISE CVN 65
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV 67
USS NIMITZ CVN 68
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69
USS CARL VINSON CVN 70
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVN 71
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVN 73
USS JOHN C. STENNIS CVN 74
USS HARRY S. TRUMAN CVN 75





















Table 2.  Present CVW Forces. CVWR-20 is a Naval Reserve Air-wing based at 




A notional CSG and her respective capabilities are shown below in Figure 2. 
Notional Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
CVN (Aircraft Carrier, Nuclear Propulsion) 1 CVN
CVW (Carrier Air Wing) 1
CG (Guided Missile Cruiser) 1
DDG (Guided Missle Destroyer) 1 CG
FFG (Fast Frigate, Guided Missile) 1
SSN (Attack Submarine, Nuclear Propulsion) 1




Strike/Fighter Aircraft 44-46 FFG
Airborne Early Warning Aircraft 4
Electronic Warfare Aircraft 4
Anti-Surface/Tanker Aircraft 8 SSN
Helicopter Squadron (ASW/CSAR) 1
Helicopter Squadron (Logistics) 1
Sustained strike sorties/day 100+ AOE
Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Mobile Unit 1
SEAL Platoon/element 1
Notional Carrier Strike Group (CSG)
 
Figure 2.    Notional Carrier Strike Group (CSG).  Two Air Defense (AEGIS) Surface 
Combatants are required, i.e., a combination of CGs/DDGs. The number 
of available Vertical Launch System (VLS) cells will change accordingly: 
1 CG (122 Cells), 1 FLT I/II DDG (90 Cells) and 1 FLT IIA DDG (96 
Cells). * [OPNAV, 2003c]   
 
Forward deployment of the CSG combat team affords the nation the option of a 
rapid crisis response without the commitment of forces ashore and provides “the 
capabilities of tactical aviation without the need for immediate access to bases ashore.” 
[Perin] In the end, the CSG presents a wide range of possible responses across a 
conflict’s full spectrum. As Congressman Robert C. Scott (D-VA) stated, “Ultimately, 
aircraft carriers are the instrument called upon most frequently when the aggression must 
be stopped. More importantly, they are diplomatic instruments used to contain conflict 
and prevent wars from breaking out in the first place.” [Scott, 1993] The importance of 
the CSG and the nature of its mission are further characterized below: 
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The CSG is intended to be a flexible, heavy strike Navy group that can 
operate in a low-to-high threat environment, in the littorals or in open 
ocean, during day and night, in a variety of weather conditions, and under 
restricted EMCON. CSG capabilities support success of initial crisis 
response missions and are assumed to be undertaken in non-permissive 
environments characterized by multiple threats including, but not limited 
to anti-ship missiles, fighter/attack aircraft, electromagnetic sensors and 
jammers, cruise missile equipped surface combatants, submarines (both 
nuclear and diesel types), and terrorist threats.[OPNAV, 2003c] 
 
3. Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP) 
Prior to December 2003, the method by which the Navy maintained, trained and 
deployed its surface forces was referred to as the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle 
(IDTC).  The IDTC was essentially divided into five recurring phases: Deployment, 
Maintenance, Basic Training Phase, Intermediate Training Phase and Advanced Training 
Phase.  Upon completion of the maintenance phase, forces concentrated on unit-level 
readiness and would progress to multi-unit and then battle group training as specific 
readiness milestones were achieved. In this cycle’s early phases, readiness degradation 
was accepted as maintenance was conducted and as new crew members came aboard. 
The training cycle’s culmination was deployment – at which point the battle group was 
properly prepared to deploy, fight as a unit, and integrate into a joint force effectively.   
Although this training/deployment template was used through the Cold War’s 
later years, it limited flexibility to surge United States Naval Forces to multiple regional 
conflicts for extended periods of time. Over the long run, the IDTC restricted deployment 
options as well as our ability to use naval assets that had achieved high levels of 
readiness.  Loren Thompson, a navy consultant and defense analyst at the Lexington 
Institute said, “The navy is migrating away from the static deployment patterns of the 
Cold War in order to be more flexible and responsive to unpredictable threats.” [Quicker 




Change prevailed soon after Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)/Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF) when surge deployment of seven CSGs provided the new model for the 
future. Admiral William J. Fallon, Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command 
(COMFLTFORCOM), discusses the Navy’s role in OIF/OEF below. 
We deployed seven aircraft carriers, nine ‘Big Deck’ assault ships, and a 
total of 182 ships in support of OIF/OEF. This surge of Navy capability 
taught us that the methodology used during the Cold War for manning, 
maintaining, and training our fleet would not produce surge readiness 
required in the 21st century security environment. [Commander U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command, 2004c]  
In response to this new reality, the doctrine under which naval forces, train, 
maintain, and deploy was revamped.  Admiral Vern Clark, USN, Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO), developed a new training and deployment construct named the Fleet 
Readiness Plan (FRP). The FRP and the associated Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) 
effectively replaced the Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC) on December 1, 2003.  
This transformation from the established and predictable days of the IDTC forced 
decision makers to inspect and to alter the manner in which scheduling on the waterfront 
was conducted. Below, Admiral Fallon addresses the importance and advantages of the 
FRP.  
The current global security environment requires that we provide the 
President and SECDEF with scalable options of combat capability. FRP 
and its associated Fleet Readiness Training Plan (FRTP) are designed to 
give operational commanders the flexibility to utilize naval assets in 
innovative ways to enhance regional deterrence, meet specific combatant 
commander requirements, including security cooperation activities, multi-
CSG fleet exercises, and rotational forward operations while building a 
viable and credible surge capability. In short, FRP is all about fleet 
readiness and the navy’s ability to provide significant combat power in 
response to a crisis. It is not about keeping the fleet deployed longer or 
sending the fleet to sea without notice. [Commander U.S. Fleet Forces 
Command, 2004a] 
4. “6+2” Construct  
The 2003 Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOC) mandates how 
the Navy and Marine Corps team “will operate across the full range of military operations 
in the near, mid, and far terms through 2020.” [Naval Operating Concept for Joint 
6
Operations, 2003] This concept demands the joint capability to defend the homeland, 
deter aggression in four critical areas and swiftly defeat the effort (SDTE) in two 
overlapping wars with the ability to defeat one of the aforementioned adversaries 
decisively. [Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations, 2003]   
To meet this requirement, under the FRP and FRTP, the Navy developed the 
“6+2” Carrier Strike Group (CSG) surge employment construct. This concept promises 
six CSGs available for employment within 30 days and an additional two CSGs available 
for employment within 90 days.  Under this construct a series of progressive readiness 
states have been established: surge ready, deployable, sustainment and emergency surge. 
The depot-level maintenance and post-maintenance “shake down” states are hard 
constraints that do not change and are determined in accordance with the type of depot-
level maintenance conducted. A notional 24-month FRTP is shown in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3.    Notional 24-month FRTP. In addition to the four progressive readiness 
states are the Maintenance and Post-Maintenance “Shake Down” states.  
 
The milestones for each readiness state are described in Table 3.  While the “6” 
CSGs are drawn from the surge ready, deployable, or sustainment states, the additional 
“2” CSGs are drawn from the emergency surge state.  These readiness states are cyclical 
and revolve around established maintenance requirements for each of the aircraft carrier 
classes.  Depending on the type and length of the maintenance period the time to achieve 
emergency surge status will vary.  For instance, under the Incremental Maintenance 
Program (IMP) for CVN 68 Nimitz class carriers, following a six-month Planned 
Incremental Availability (PIA) a carrier would have 90 days to meet the emergency surge 
requirements.  Using the same strategy however, following a 10.5 month Docking 
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Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA), five months are required to meet the 
emergency surge requirements.  Table 4 illustrates the notional progressive readiness 
states from which the “6+2” carrier force is drawn. 
   
State Minimum Training Requirements
• All units obtained C-2 Readiness or better.
• Completion of Blue Water Certification.
• Completion of COMPTUEX/Final Battle Problem (FEP).
• Completion of Air wing(s) CVW Fallon qualifications.
• Refresher training completed as required.
• "Surge Ready" status has already been met.
• In addition, specified advanced training has been met, namely:
(1) Completion of Advanced Phase training.
(2) Completion of Joint Task Force Exercise (JTFEX).
(3) Refresher training completed as required.
• Completion of Tailored Ship Training Availabilities (TSTAs).
• Completion of Final Evaluation Problem (FEP).
• Completion of Advanced Readiness Phase (ARP).









• All group / unit training and certification requirements have been successfully 
completed.
• Unit / group is fully certified and capable to perform all required missions.
• To include: fulfillment of all training and exercises to support applicable Strike 
Groups/Squadron integration.
• Status attained for individual units or groups that have completed minimum 




Table 3.  FRP Progressive Readiness States. [OPNAV, 2003c] The minimum 
training requirements are listed for each state. 
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Carrier Strike Group (CSG) Readiness States
CSG 1 Deployable - Surge Status met - Advanced Training Completed
CSG 2 Deployable - Surge Status met - Advanced Training Completed
CSG 4 Surge Ready - All units have obtained C-2 level of readiness
CSG 5 Surge Ready - All units have obtained C-2 level of readiness
CSG 6 Sustainment - Post Deployment
"6+2" CSG Employment
Emergency Surge - Available w/in 90 days upon conclusion of PIA 
type Maintenance.*




CSG 3 Deployable (FDNF) - Surge Status met - Advanced Training Completed
 
 
Table 4.  “6+2” CSG Employment. *Timeframe varies by type of availability 
involved – 90 days for post Planned Incremental Availability (PIA), five 
months post Docking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA), seven 
months post Reactor Complex Overhaul (RCOH), and nine months post 
new construction. [OPNAV, 2003c] 
 
A key factor in determining the Navy’s ability to meet FRP guidelines is the 
consideration of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces (FDNF).  These forces are stationed 
in Yokosuka, Japan; Sasebo, Japan; and Guam and for the purposes of this analysis, we 
will concentrate on the CSG presence in Yokosuka, Japan.  The unique characteristic of 
the FDNF is that it will always be counted in either the “6” or “+2” category, depending 
upon its location in the maintenance cycle.  This force never falls out of the “6+2” 
equation and in the worst case scenario will be available within 90 days.   
As a rule, FDNF platforms have higher Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) rates 
and demand greater flexibility in their schedules in order to provide near continual 
presence in the Western Pacific Theatre.  The present FDNF carrier, CV 63 USS Kitty 
Hawk, operates under the Progressive Maintenance (PROG) maintenance schedule.  
“This maintenance philosophy is designed to support ships with reduced manning, 
limited organizational level maintenance, and operational tempos that limit availability  
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periods.”[OPNAV, 2003b] CV63 was commissioned in September of 1968 and 
unofficially expects to decommission in December 2008. Upon its retirement from 
service, theoretically, another carrier will replace it and serve as the next FDNF carrier.   
The Navy’s ability to meet the 2003 NOC requirements while using the FRP and 
FRTP construct was demonstrated during the naval exercise “Summer Pulse 04,” 
conducted between June and August of 2004.  The Navy simultaneously deployed 7 of 
the nations’ 12 CSGs throughout the five operational AORs, and although specific results 
of the exercise were not released to the public, the exercise tested the logistics and shore 
infrastructure, joint and coalition interoperability and most importantly validated the 
sound construct of the FRP and FRTP.  The seven CSGs which deployed simultaneously 
included the USS George Washington (CVN 73 - Norfolk), USS John C Stennis (CVN 
74 - San Diego), USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63 - Yoko), USS John F Kennedy (CV 67 - 
Mayport), USS Harry S Truman (CVN 71 - Norfolk), USS Enterprise (CVN 65 - 
Norfolk) and the USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76 -San Diego). [Commander U.S. Fleet 
Forces Command, 2004c] 
 
B. SCHEDULING UNDER THE FRP  
This thesis provides a quantitative analysis of the scheduling impact of waterfront 
time constraints, training objectives and material preparedness, on the FRP.  It aids 
schedulers in maximizing the number of aircraft carriers available for employment at a 
specific time. Additionally, it provides Type Commanders (TYCOMs) and Fleet 
Commanders (C2F/C3F) with a responsive scheduling tool that enables them to 
enumerate various scheduling possibilities and the effects they impart on asset 
availability and assured readiness.  A critical distinction that must be made when 
discussing FRP and FRTP is that it is a maintenance, training and deployment construct. 
It does not dictate how units deploy or when they should surge. It simply supplies or 
provides the units for potential “employment.” 
As an aid to the reader, Figure 4, which is shown below, represents two years of 
an aggregate carrier maintenance schedule. The USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), a Forward 
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Deployed Naval Force (FDNF), accounts for the 12th carrier and is not listed in the 
CONUS maintenance schedule. 
 
Figure 4.    Two years of an aggregate carrier maintenance schedule dated May 2004.  
The shaded blocks represent maintenance periods and the associated text 
describes the type, location and length of the maintenance period.  *CV 63 
is not listed due to FDNF status.   [Naval Sea Systems Command 
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II. CARRIER EMPLOYMENT CONSTRAINTS    
A number of factors affect naval combatant’s ability to respond to a crisis.  The 
principal factors are classified in one of two categories, material or personnel 
preparedness.  Maintenance is the primary material consideration, specifically depot-level 
maintenance, while Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO), Operational Tempo 
(OPTEMPO) and Turn-Around Ratio (TAR) account for the personnel preparedness 
factors. When these constraints are met, the remaining planning consideration that affects 
a carrier’s employment is the location of its intended operations.  If the ship is responding 
to a crisis, time and distance calculations are critical.  Even though we do not specifically 
address PERSTEMPO, OPTEMPO and TAR in this model, these factors are discussed 
because they certainly affect the CSG’s ability to deploy.  These constraints are soft 
constraints, in the sense that they can be violated in a time of crisis; however, they do 
provide quality-of-life (QOL) guidelines to be followed in the steady-state environment. 
This analysis concentrates on the affect of depot-level maintenance on the employment of 
the CSG under the FRP construct. 
 
A. MATERIAL PREPAREDNESS 
1. Depot Level Maintenance 
OPNAVINST 4700.K, the maintenance policy instruction for U.S. Navy ships, 
identifies three levels of maintenance: organizational-level, intermediate-level and depot-
level maintenance.  Organizational-level maintenance refers to the set of maintenance 
actions that lie within the capability of the ship’s force.  Intermediate-level maintenance 
demands “higher skill, capability or capacity than that of the organizational-level.” 
[OPNAV, 2003a]  The third maintenance level has the greatest potential to affect a 
CSG’s employability and therefore is the focus of this work. Depot-level maintenance is 
defined as:  
that maintenance which requires skills or facilities beyond the level of the 
organizational and intermediate levels and is performed by naval 
shipyards, private shipyards, naval ship repair facilities, or item depot  
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activities. Approved alterations and modifications which update and 
improve the ship’s military and technical capabilities are also 
accomplished.  [OPNAV, 2003a] 
Table 5 displays a segment of a notional depot-level maintenance schedule.  The 
schedule shown represents the Incremental Maintenance Plan (IMP) maintenance 
strategy used by the Nimitz Class (CV 68) aircraft carrier. The comprehensive 
maintenance strategies to include Progressive maintenance (PROG) and the Engineering 
Operating Cycle (EOC) are illustrated in Appendix B.   
 
CVN 68 IMP RCOH PSA-SRA   | -------- |   PIA1   | -------- |   PIA1   | -------- |   DPIA1   |
NOTE C DPIA1 66 0 19 - 24 43 - 48 67 - 76.5
DPIA2 66 -------- |   PIA2   | -------- |   PIA2   | -------- |   DPIA2   | --------
DPIA3 66 95.5 - 100.5 119.5 - 124.5 143.5 - 153
PIA1 18 |   PIA3   | -------- |   PIA3   | -------- |   DPIA3   | -------- |   PIA3   |
PIA2 18 172 - 177 196 - 201 220 - 229.5 248.5 - 253.5
PIA3 18 -------- |   PIA3   | -------- |   RCOH   | -------- | PSA-SRA | --------










Table 5.  Representative Intervals, Durations and Repair Mandays for Depot Level 
Availabilities.  A segment of the notional Representative Intervals, 
Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair Mandays for Depot Level 
Maintenance Availability for a Nimitz Class (CVN 68) Aircraft Carrier. 
[OPNAV, 2003b] 
 
Generally, in each of the maintenance strategies there are three significant types 
of availabilities: Planned Incremental Availabilities (PIAs) or Extended Selected 
Restricted Availability (ESRAs), which last six months, Docking Planned Incremental 
Availabilities (DPIAs) or Extended Dry-Docking Selected Restricted Availabilities 
(EDSRAs), which last 10.5 months, and Refueling Complex Overhauls (RCOH), which 
last approximately 33 months. 
Below, Table 6 lists the CNO allowable deviations for carrier depot availabilities. 
The CNO allowable deviations for Carrier Depot Availabilities as they apply to the 
notional segment illustrated in Table 5 are shown in Table 7. Maintenance terms and 
definitions, according to OPNAV Notice 4700, are listed in Appendix A. 
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0-36 months +/- 3 months
37-48 months +/- 4 months
49-60 months +/- 5 months
61-72 months +/- 6 months
Greater than 72 months +/- 7 months
Allowable Deviaiton
Period from start of maintenance 
cycle to start of Representative 
Availability
 
Table 6.  CNO Allowable Deviations for Carrier Depot Availabilities.  “To ensure 
compatibility with ship’s employment schedule and to facilitate depot 
work loading, deviation from the representative depot availability interval 
is authorized.” [OPNAV, 2003b] 
 
CVN 68 IMP RCOH PSA-SRA   | -------- |   PIA1   | -------- |   PIA1   | -------- |   DPIA1   |
DPIA1 66 0 19 - 24 43 - 48 67 - 76.5
+/- 3 +/- 4 +/- 6
DPIA2 66 -------- |   PIA2   | -------- |   PIA2   | -------- |   DPIA2   | --------
DPIA3 66 95.5 - 100.5 119.5 - 124.5 143.5 - 153
+/- 7 +/- 7 +/- 7
PIA1 18 |   PIA3   | -------- |   PIA3   | -------- |   DPIA3   | -------- |   PIA3   |
PIA2 18 172 - 177 196 - 201 220 - 229.5 248.5 - 253.5
+/- 7 +/- 7 +/- 7 +/- 7
PIA3 18 -------- |   PIA3   | -------- |   RCOH   | -------- | PSA-SRA | --------
PSA-SRA 281.5 - 277.5 296.5 0 5 - 8
+/- 7 +/- 3









Table 7.  Applied CNO allowable Deviations. A segment of the allowable 
deviations that correspond to the notional Representative Intervals, 
Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair Mandays for Depot Level 
Maintenance Availability for a Nimitz Class (CVN 68) Aircraft Carrier. 
[OPNAV, 2003b] 
 
2. Repair Facilities  
The repair facilities that conduct depot-level maintenance of aircraft carriers for 
the U.S. Atlantic (LANTFLT) and Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) are as follows: Newport 
News Shipbuilding Company (NEWS) and Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NORVA) for 
LANTFLT; Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PUGET) for PACFLT.  The Forward 
Deployed Naval Force (FDNF) receives maintenance at the Yokosuka Ship Repair 
Facility (YOKO). The capabilities and constraints of each U.S. shipyard are listed below:  
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There is now only one dry-dock in PACFLT and two in LANTFLT 
capable of performing a DPIA. The first 7 to 8 months of each DPIA are 
spent in dry-dock.  The first 14 months of each RCOH are also spent in 
dry-dock in LANTFLT.  Therefore, if two consecutive carriers need 
DPIAs, the second one will (always in PACFLT and often in LANTFLT) 
have to wait for the first one to finish the dry-dock portion of its DPIA 
before it can go into the yards.  This could push a ship’s whole schedule 
back, possibly forcing it to delay its next deployment. [Behrens, 2001] 
3. Repair Mandays 
In addition to facility availability, there must also be an “available” workforce. 
Notional mandays or workforce-planning measures are provided for each aircraft carrier 
class in Appendix B.  These figures are notional and “changes to the mandays may be 
required based on actual ship material condition, actual shipyard estimates, or for 
additional services associated with extended duration availabilities.” [OPNAV, 2003a]  
Although labor is generally “available,” in this case, cost efficiency is the driving factor 
and presents a very real constraint.  
 
B. PERSONNEL PREPAREDNESS 
 
1. Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO) 
The manner in which we train, maintain, and deploy our forces is changing, yet 
the principles that confine our ability to do so remain constant.  In order to support 
national objectives while maintaining a reasonable quality of life for naval personnel, the 
CNO has established the PERSTEMPO program for all U.S. Navy commands/units. 
[OPNAV, 1990] This program is bound by the following guidelines: 
 
(1).  Maximum deployment length of six months, portal to portal, 
(2).  Minimum 2.0: 1 Turn-around Ratio (TAR) between deployments, 
(3).  Minimum of 50% time in homeport for a unit over a 5-year cycle 
calculated three years back and two years forward based on current 
schedules. [OPNAV, 1990] 
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By definition, PERSTEMPO is “A comparison of a unit’s days not in homeport 
(NHPO) over a specific period of time, expressed as a percentage of time away from 
homeport.” [OPNAV, 1990]   
 
2. Turn-around Ratio (TAR) 
According to OPNAV guidance, Turn-around Ratio (TAR) is the ratio between 
the numbers of days a unit spends at home between deployments and the length of the 
last deployment in days calculated to the nearest tenth. [OPNAV, 1990] 
Deployment length is essential to understanding TAR and is defined as the 
“months spent deployed (portal to portal) without respect to operational control 
(OPCON) or en route stops.” As defined in Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) 1-03.1 
(Operational Reports), any unit away from homeport for more than eight weeks (56 days) 
is considered deployed. [OPNAV, 1990] 
 
3. Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) 
Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) – There are two types: deployed OPTEMPO 
and non-deployed OPTEMPO.  Deployed OPTEMPO is the fraction of time a ship 
spends at sea while deployed and non-deployed OPTEMPO is the fraction of time a ship 
spends at sea while not deployed. 
 
C. TIME AND DISTANCE CALCULATIONS  
For the sake of demonstration deployment origins have been limited to Norfolk, 
VA, San Diego, CA, and Yokosuka, Japan.  The destinations are vital areas of interest 
and include the Panama Canal, Caribbean, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Western Pacific 
and Singapore. 
The calculations in Table 8 were made with a speed of advance (SOA) of 14 
knots, the standard Navy SOA. Although CSGs can and do execute higher transit speeds, 
an over-all 14 knot SOA toward an AOR allows for flight operations en route that 
frequently require multiple courses and speeds.  
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Norfolk Caribbean 1,279 91.4 3.8
Mediterranean (Naples) 4,336 309.7 12.9
Persian Gulf 8,794 628.1 26.2
San Diego Panama 2,843 203.1 8.5
Western Pacific (Japan) 4,917 351.2 14.6
Singapore 7,736 552.6 23.0
Persian Gulf 10,955 782.5 32.6
Yokosuka Persian Gulf 6,102 435.9 18.2
Time (days)Origin Destination Transit Distance (NM) Time (hrs)
 
Table 8.  Transit Distances. Transit distances are a primary consideration in the 
event of a crisis.  This table has been adapted from a 1994 study by 







III. LITERATURE REVIEW, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
MODEL FORMULATION 
A. PREVIOUS WORK ON CARRIER MAINTENANCE MODELS 
The problem of aircraft carrier maintenance scheduling is a deterministic 
scheduling problem—there is a finite number of carriers to be scheduled and a single 
objective—meeting established Department of Defense (DOD) planning requirements.  
This problem has been approached in the past as a set partitioning problem or a multi-
commodity network flow model. [Ayik, 1998] A review of previous studies that use these 
techniques are described below. 
In the technical report “Navy Forward Presence Coverage and Response Times” 
the authors, Brown, Lawphongpanich and Schrady, model deployment scheduling as a 
two-commodity network flow problem with side constraints. As the title suggests, they 
address the problem of AOR coverage and crisis response time.  The foundation of their 
model, Coverage and Response Estimation (CORE), rests upon the following tenets: 
 
• Individual carriers are optimally scheduled for deployments over a ten-
year frame, 1997 to 2006, so as to maximize European Command 
(EUCOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM) coverage. [Brown, 1997] 
• The model is a deterministic, time indexed, weekly resolution model. 
• Carriers must be in one of three states: maintenance, workup or 
deployment.  
• Scheduling is done globally: LANT and PAC carriers are not scheduled 
separately but rather all carriers are considered within the single 
scheduling problem. [Brown, 1997] 
 
The model ultimately measures the percentage of coverage and response times as 
a function of the number of carriers in the Navy force structure. “The model was run with 
the number of carriers ranging from 7 to 16. The upper value of 16 was selected to 
calibrate the model with the (then) present OPNAV Force Presence Model, which 
calculates that 14 to 16 carriers are necessary for 100% coverage.”[Brown, 1997] 
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A similar study by Ayik, analyzes the U.S. Navy’s ability to maximize coverage 
in the Areas of Responsibility (AORs) by shifting existing scheduled maintenance 
periods within allowable limits as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).  It 
investigates the effects of maintenance shifting on the following measures: 
 
• Crisis response time: the expected time to send the closest carrier to a 
crisis location;   
• AOR coverage: the percentage of time a carrier is available in a specific 
AOR; 
• Economic costs and implications. [Ayik, 1998] 
 
Ayik’s study builds on the CORE model and introduces a Generalized Coverage 
and Response Estimation (GENCoRE) model to investigate the effect of one-month shifts 
on simultaneous deployment planning and maintenance scheduling.   
Further research by Ayik models carrier deployment planning as a set-partitioning 
problem (SPP).  In his SPP formulation “all possible schedules that provide the period-
by-period status of each carrier for the planning horizon” are generated, subject to 
operations and maintenance constraints. [Ayik, 2000]  Furthermore, the formulation 
“maximizes coverage in the areas of responsibility (AORs) subject to the constraints that 
exactly one alternate schedule is chosen for each carrier and each AOR should be covered 
in each period.” [Ayik, 2000] 
 
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In this analysis we explore the FRP and FRTP under four independent, steady-
state, training schedules:  “6 to 18” 12-month employable (D) state schedule, “3 to 15” 
12-month employable (D) state schedule, “6 to 21” 15-month employable (D) state 
schedule and the “3 to 18” 15-month employable (D) state schedule. The first two 
schedules follow a notional, 24-month training cycle while the last two schedules follow 
a suggested, 27-month training cycle.   
Under each of these schedules, three unique scenarios are modeled.  The scenarios 
are as follows: (1) baseline FRP (12 CSGs); (2) loss of an Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT) 
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CSG; and (3) gain a LANTFLT CSG.  The scenarios begin in August 2004, end in July 
2013, and follow the aggregate carrier maintenance schedule of 12 May 2004 provided 
by the NAVSEA maintenance office. Table 9 summarizes the scenarios used to inspect 
the FRP and FRTP. 













Notional         
(24-month 
training cycle)
Suggested       
(27-month 
training cycle)
"6 to 18" 
"3 to 15" 
"6 to 21"
"3 to 18" 
A 24-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in each training cylce is allowed to 
vary between 6 and 18 months.
A 24-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in the first two training cylces is 
allowed to vary between 3 and 15 months — the remaining 
"employable" states vary between 6 and 18 months.
A 27-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in each training cylce is allowed to 
vary between 6 and 21 months.
A 27-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in the first two training cylces is 
allowed to vary between 3 and 18 months — the remaining 
"employable" states vary between 6 and 21 months.
 
 
Table 9.  FRP Scenarios. Changing the durations of the “employable” periods and 
shifting them earlier, or later in the cycle, relaxes the optimization 
problem and permits optimal planning under the FRP/FRTP construct. 
 
1. Notional Training Plan vs. Suggested Training Plan  
The notional training plan adheres to the representative intervals, durations, 
maintenance cycles and repair mandays for depot-level maintenance availabilities of U.S. 
Navy ships as set forth in OPNAV Notice 4700. [OPNAV, 2003b]  The standard training 
cycles under the notional training plan last 24 months and have a 12-month employable 
(D) state—that is, 12 months are spent in the surge ready, deployable, or sustainment 
states.  The remaining 12 months are spent in the maintenance, post-maintenance “shake-
down,” or emergency surge states. 
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Conversely, the training cycles under the suggested training plan last 27 months 
and have a 15-month employable (D) state.  Under this plan, the three months that are 
gained in the employable (D) state relax the optimization problem, increase scheduling 
options and improve our ability to satisfy the “6+2” FRP requirement. 
 
2. Steady-State FRP  
The four independent training schedules we investigate are run through the model 
in the steady-state. Steady-state FRP represents peacetime operations where the 
constraints placed on the model come specifically from FRP guidelines, i.e. “6+2” 
capability and irrefutable depot level maintenance constraints.  The ability to meet these 
guidelines answers the supply side question of FRP – “Is it possible to have six Aircraft 
Carrier Strike Groups available within 30 days of a crisis and an additional two CSGs 
available within 90 days of a crisis?”  It does not propose the manner in which the CSGs 
should be deployed or when they should surge. It does, however, provide “windows” for 
employment.  Whereas past deployment schedules were driven primarily by AOR 
presence requirements, this model’s employment windows are primarily driven by the 
need to maintain “6+2” surge ready force. 
 
3. Maintenance Inputs 
Table 10 represents a suggested 27-month maintenance schedule covering seven 
full training cycles for each respective aircraft carrier.  The schedule in its entirety is used 
as data input to the model.   
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Cycle E Dmin Dmax MWD MWP MED MEP P
k2 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 9 3
CVN 65 2 3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
Enterprise 3 3 6 21 0 0 7 4 5
4 3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
5 3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
6 3 6 21 0 0 7 4 5
7 3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
k3 1 0 9 9 0 0 8 8 5
CV 67 2 3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
JFK 3 3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
4 3 6 21 0 0 8 4 5
5 3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
6 3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
7 3 6 21 0 0 8 4 5
k4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
CVN 68 2 3 6 21 0 6 0 0 3
Nimitz 3 3 6 21 7 4 0 0 5
4 3 6 21 0 6 0 0 3
5 3 6 21 0 6 0 0 3
6 3 6 21 7 4 0 0 5












Table 10.  Suggested 27-month Maintenance Schedule. A “cycle” consists of an 
Emergency Surge window (E), an Employable window (D), a 
Maintenance period (MXX: MWD=Maintenance / West Coast / DPIA) and a 
Proficiency / “Shake Down” Training window (P). 
 
The individual cycles in Table 10 vary slightly depending upon the respective position of 
the carriers in their maintenance schedules.  For instance, CVN 65 begins the scenario 
with one month remaining in her employable (D) state (Dmin to Dmax) whereas CVN 68 
begins the scenario with one month remaining in the maintenance state—West Coast, 
PIA type maintenance (MWP). 
 
4. Varying the Employable (D) State Duration 
Holding the material and personnel preparedness constraints constant, the 
remaining factor available for scrutiny is the employable (D) state – that state which falls 
after depot-level maintenance, post-maintenance “shake down” and the emergency surge 
state and consists of the surge ready, deployable, and sustainment states. For purposes of 
the calculations which follow, key state durations are labeled in Figure 5. The employable 
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(D) state duration is labeled “A,” the depot-level maintenance, post-maintenance “shake 
down” and the emergency surge state durations are labeled “B,” and the entire training 
cycle duration is labeled “C.” 
 
J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
PIA Maintenance








Surge Surge Ready Deployable Sustainment
 
 
Figure 5.    Notional FRP Training Cycle displayed for purposes of the above 
calculation. 
 
The notation “6 to 18” indicates a minimum employable (D)  length of six months 
and a maximum employable (D) length of 18 months, the “3 to 15” notation states the 
minimum employable (D)  length is three months and the maximum employable (D) 
length is 15 months.  The significant difference between the two is the duration of time 
available to train and achieve the readiness state required to undertake the ensuing 
deployment.  For instance, under the “6 to 18” training schedule, a CSG has six months 
after completion of the emergency surge state to meet the minimum surge ready and 
deployable state requirements as previously listed in Table 3.  In the “3 to 18” case, a 
CSG has three months to meet these same requirements.  
 
When we look at the fraction of time a CSG is available for employment we can 
quantify the policy impact of varying the employable (D) state duration under the 
different training schedules. The formula for calculating the percentage of time a CSG is 
available for employment is 
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 ( )  %       
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Employable D durationof time available for employment
Total time in the training cycle
A employable D state duration months
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    ( )
%             
tate durations months
C entire training cycle duration months
A Aof time available for employment where C A B
A B C
=




In the case of the notional FRP training cycle displayed in Figure 5, the percentage of 
time the CSG is available for employment is 
12 %       50%.
24 
monthsof time available for employment
months
= =  
 
In the case of the suggested FRP training cycle the percentage of time the CSG is 
available for employment is 
15 %       56%.
27 
monthsof time available for employment
months
= =  
 
Our analysis shows that this extra 6% does make a difference. 
 
5. Employable (D) State Duration Output  
Table 11, shown below, displays a portion of the output received after each run of 
the model.  The optimal column chosen is presented and the associated durations of the 
employable (D) state are shown to the right.  For example, for aircraft carrier k2, column 
65 provided the optimal employable (D) state durations.  Under this column the 
employable (D) state in the first training cycle lasts one month; in the second training 
cycle the employable (D) state lasts 21 months, and so on. Because the durations of the 
first two cycles are dependent upon a carrier’s location in the training cycle at the 
beginning of the scenario, some durations may not fall within the “6 to 21” month 
window. 
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1st Cycle 2nd Cycle 3rd Cycle 4th Cycle 5th Cycle 6th Cycle 7th Cycle
k2 c65 1 21 17 21 21 21 21
k3 c100 9 18 15 21 21 21 21
k4 c257 0 21 21 20 21 21 21
k5 c520 0 14 21 19 21 21 21
k6 c337 21 16 20 21 21 21 21
k7 c22 0 3 16 20 21 21 21
k8 c1 21 21 21 21 21 21 21
k9 c273 5 21 20 20 21 21 21
k10 c61 9 18 21 21 21 21 21
k11 c869 16 21 18 21 21 21 21





Table 11.  Employable (D) state durations from the baseline “6 to 21” 15-month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule.  
 
C. MODEL FORMULATION  
The number of possible employment schedules in this problem is very large and, 
consequently, we use column generation to make the analysis more convenient—we 
generate a large, but manageable, number of potential schedules for each carrier.  Each of 
these schedules becomes a column in a set partitioning formulation, which formulates the 
problem of choosing a set of schedules, one per carrier, that is, in some sense “best” for 
the overall maintenance schedule for all carriers. Even after a column generation, the data 
set is still very large—there are 5,760,000 rows (12 carriers*4,000 columns*120 time 
periods) of input data. For the purpose of this analysis, we generate 4,000 columns for 
each carrier and each column is indexed over 120 time periods. 
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The model we use to explore aircraft carrier maintenance scheduling is a time 
indexed, monthly resolution optimization model. This model is formulated upon the 
Representative Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles and Repair Mandays for Depot 
Level Maintenance Availabilities over a ten-year (120-month) timeframe.  It is important 
to note that each aircraft carrier is scheduled according to its respective ship class 
maintenance strategy: CV 63 Kitty Hawk Class - Forward-Deployed Naval Forces 
(FDNF) - Progressive maintenance (PROG); CVN 65 Enterprise - Engineering Operating 
Cycle (EOC); CV 67 John F. Kennedy - Engineering Operating Cycle (EOC); and CVN 
68 Nimitz Class - the Incremental Maintenance Program (IMP).  The strategies are 
further defined in Appendix A. 
We divided the Carrier Strike Group FRP maintenance and training schedule into 
four distinct states: Emergency surge (E), employable (D), maintenance (M) and 
proficiency Training (P).  The emergency surge (E) state lasts for three months and 
immediately follows the proficiency training (P) state.  Though the employable (D) state 
is represented by one variable, three states are captured within the duration of this state 
timeframe: surge-ready, deployable, and sustainment. The maintenance (M) state has 
four independent sub-states determined by: homeport, (LANTFLT or PACFLT), and type 
of maintenance, (PIA or DPIA).  The duration of the proficiency training (P) state varies 
with the type of maintenance conducted. Following a Planned Incremental Availability 
(PIA), three months are required; following a Docking Planned Incremental Availability 
(DPIA), five months are required; following a Reactor Complex Overhaul (RCOH), 
seven months are required; and following the new construction of an aircraft carrier, nine 
months are required until the unit is considered “emergency surge-able.”  [OPNAV, 
2003c] 
For each carrier, we generate a fixed number of employment schedules (currently 
4,000) from which we will ultimately choose one.  Each schedule is completely 
determined by the length of each employable (D) state interval.  Over 120 months, a 
carrier may have up to seven such employable (D) intervals.  Once the lengths of these 
are determined for one schedule, we can determine in which state the carrier will be for 
all time periods.  
Given the 4,000 schedules for each carrier, we develop an optimization model that 
chooses one schedule for each carrier so that the overall demands on maintenance 
facilities is feasible and so that we come as close as possibly to meeting the FRP “6+2” 
coverage requirements.  Each schedule for a CSG is completely specified by a set of time 
indexed parameters for each state that indicate whether or not the CSG is in that state in 
each time period. 
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The optimization model is formulated as follows: 
 
1. Optimization Model 
Indices:   
                                Carrier Strike Groups {1, 2,3,... }k k ∈ K
T
     
                 States of the Carrier Strike Group
                   { e-surge,  deployable,  
                   PACFLT carrier in DPIA maintenance, 




s S E D
M
M
∈ = = =
=
=  PIA maintenance,
                   LANTFLT carrier in DPIA maintenance,                  
                   LANTFLT carrier in PIA maintenance,                









              t t                  Time Index (months) {1, 2,3... }∈
              c c                  Column Index  {1, 2,3...3000}∈
 
Data: 
              a t                  CSG Employment Requirement at time 
              b t                  CSG Surge-Ready Re quirement at time 
                          Penalty for not meeting employment requirement  at time tpa a t  
                          Penalty for not meeting surge-ready requirement  at time tpb b t  
                          Penalty for not meeting dry-dock requirements at time tpd t  
              , ,            CSG  is in state " "  at time  in schedule k c tE k E t c
c
 
               , ,            CSG  is in state " "  at time  in schedule k c tD k D t
               , ,           PACFLT CSG  is in state " "  conducting PIA maintenance, 
                   at time  in schedule 
WP
k c tM k M
t c
               , ,           PACFLT CSG  is in state " "  conducting DPIA maintenance, 
                   at time  in schedule 
WD
k c tM k M
t c
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               , ,           LANTFLT CSG  is in state " "  conducting PIA maintenance, 
                   at time  in schedule 
EP
k c tM k M
t c
                , ,           LANTFLT CSG  is in state " "  conducting DPIA maintenance, 
                   at time  in schedule 
ED
k c tM k M
t c
                , ,             CSG  is in state " "  at time in schedule k c tP k P t c
              
 
       Max Number of PACFLT CSGs in drydock DPIA maintenance 
                     at any time
WDmaint  
       Max Number of PACFLT CSGs in PIA maintenance at any timeWPmaint  
       Max Number of LANTFLT CSGs in drydock DPIA maintenance
                     at any time
EDmaint  
       Max Number of LANTFLT CSGs in PIA maintenance at any timEPmaint  
 
e  
                        Time indexed, discount factor for the penalty functionstdiscount
                              Rate of exponential decay of the penalty functionsrate
 
Decision Variables: 
                               Slack employment variabletZA
                 
              Slack emergency surge-ready variable 
                    (within 90 days of PIA maintenance)
tZB
                         Slack dry-dock variabletDdock
                 
,            Binary variable:
1   if CSG  follows schedule in column 
                            
0   otherwise
k cX
k c
   

 
Objective Function and Constraints: 
( )Min ( ) * * * *t t t t t t
t
discount t ZA pa ZB pb Ddock pd+ +∑                                       (4.0) 
Subject to: 
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,                                                                                    k c
c
X k=1 ∀∑  (4.1) 
( ) ( ), , ,
,
                                                     k c t k c t
k c
D X a  + ΖΑ ≥ ∀ ∑ t
t∀
 (4.2) 
( ) ( ) ( ), , , , ,
,
                                k c t k c t k c t
k c
D E X ZB a b + + ≥ + ∑  (4.3) 
( )( ),
,
                                                   WD WDk c
k c
M X maint t  ≤ ∑ ∀  (4.4) 
( )( ),
,
                                                   WP WPk c
k c
M X maint t  ≤ ∑ ∀  (4.5) 
( ) ( ),
,
                                    ED EDk c t
k c
M X Ddock maint t  − ≤ ∑ ∀  (4.6) 
( )( ),
,
                                                    EP EPk c
k c
M X maint t  ≤ ∑ ∀  (4.7) 
0               tZA ≥ t∀   (4.8) 
0               tZB ≥ t∀   (4.9) 
{ },          ,k cX k c ∈ 0,1 ∀   (4.10) 
 
In the above formulation, the objective is to minimize the penalty for failing to 
reach the “6+2” CSG surge requirements over the ten-year period.  
• The objective (4.0) enforces penalties for missing the presence 
requirements, and applies an optional discount to emphasize certain time 
periods over others. 
• Constraint (4.1) states that only one column, that is one schedule, can be 
chosen out of the total number of columns generated for each CSG;  
• (4.2) counts the number of employable carriers in each time period, t, and 
assesses the “shortfall” in coverage, ZAt, from a;  
• (4.3) counts the number of employable and emergency surge ready carriers 
in each time period, t, and calculates the “shortfall” in coverage, ZBt, from 
(a+b) ;  
• (4.4) provides an upper bound on the number of PACFLT aircraft carriers 
that can conduct dry-dock DPIA maintenance at any one time;  
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• (4.5) provides an upper bound on the number of PACFLT aircraft carriers 
that can conduct PIA maintenance at any one time;   
• (4.6) provides an upper bound on the number of LANTFLT aircraft 
carriers that can conduct dry-dock DPIA maintenance at any one time; 
• (4.7) provides an upper bound on the number of LANTFLT aircraft 
carriers that can conduct PIA maintenance at any one time;   
• (4.8 and 4.9) non-negativity constraints;  
• (4.10) binary variable.  
 
2. Software 
The General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) was used to formulate the 
model, and the CPLEX MIP solver was used to solve the model.  The model was solved 
using an Intel(R) Pentium (R) 4 CPU 2.00 GHz based personal computer. The size of the 
model under each training schedule and for each scenario is displayed in Table 12.  The 
relative optimality criterion for a MIP problem was set to one percent.  The model arrives 
at a solution between seven and ten minutes. 
Columns are generated by the program defined in gencols.c, in Appendix D. This 
program takes, as input, a data file specifying the minimum and maximum duration of 
each employable (D) interval, and the length of every other interval, for seven cycles, for 
each carrier.  It then enumerates as many columns as needed (here, 4,000) starting with 
the column resulting from making all employable (D) intervals as long as possible, and 
then generating successive columns by shortening one employable interval at a time.  The 
first employable (D) interval is shortened by one month at a time, until it hits its 
minimum length at which point it is raised back to its maximum length, and then the 
second employable (D) interval is shortened by one month.  This proceeds, with the first 
cycle’s employment (D) interval length changing most frequently, and the last cycle 
usually not ever changing, but certainly changing most slowly.  Each of these column sets 
values for the parameters Ek,c,t, Dk,c,t, etc., and therefore determines the bulk of the 
parameters for the model. The file generated by gencols.c is input directly into the GAMS 
model.  We could generate any 4,000 columns for each carrier, and the model will choose 
the best combination of the columns presented to it.  In the next section we summarize 
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some of these results for various scenarios.  In each, we generated an appropriate set of 
columns to represent the options available in the scenario. 













A 24-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in each training cylce is allowed to 
vary between 6 and 18 months.
A 24-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in the first two training cylces is 
allowed to vary between 3 and 15 months — the remaining 
"employable" states vary between 6 and 18 months.
A 27-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in each training cylce is allowed to 
vary between 6 and 21 months.
A 27-month training cycle is modeled over 120 months.  
The "employable" state in the first two training cylces is 
allowed to vary between 3 and 18 months — the remaining 
"employable" states vary between 6 and 21 months.
Scenario
Notional         
(24-month 
training cycle)
Suggested       
(27-month 
training cycle)
"6 to 18" 
"3 to 15" 
"6 to 21"
"3 to 18" 
 
 
Table 12.  Model Sizes for Each Training Plan, Training Schedule and Scenario 
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IV. MODEL RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results from each of the four independent, steady-state, 
training schedules that we ran through our scheduling optimization model.  As a 
reminder, the model attempts to minimize deviation from the “6+2” FRP construct and 
maximize asset availability and assured readiness while adhering to established Navy 
force guidelines.  
Figure 6 displays a sample of output from the “6 to 21” baseline scenario run with 
a 15-month employable (D) state. In the first three time periods, this scenario “fails-to-
meet” (FTM) the “6” CSG requirement by two CSGs, i.e. only four CSGs are available at 
time t = 1, 2 and 3 months.  At time t = 18 months the scenario FTM “6” by one CSG and 
FTM “+2” by two CSGs.   


















Figure 6.    20 Months of FRP.  The results shown above are taken from the “6 to 21” 
baseline scenario run with a 15-month employable (D) state. Although the 
entire 120-month time frame is not shown, all of the discrepancies occur 
in the first 62 months. (FTM “6” corresponds to the variable ZAt, and 
FTM “+2” corresponds to the variable ZBt.) 
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The result presented in Figure 6 is fairly intuitive as the maintenance system has not had 
sufficient time to absorb the impact of this new scheduling construct.  It is also optimistic 
in the sense that after the first 62 months, under this training schedule, FRP is feasible.  
The primary conclusion to be drawn from this result is the FRP “6+2” requirement, under 
the “6 to 21” 15-month employable (D) state training plan, can be met, undeniably, by 
October 2009. 
  
A. MEETING THE FRP “6+2” CSG REQUIREMENT  
In the results that follow the abilities of the different training schedules to meet 
the “6+2” requirement are shown.  The first column in the table displays the percentage 
of time, out of 120 months, that the given scenario is able to meet the “6,” or the “+2” 
requirement.  The remaining columns represent the percentage of time the schedules “fail 
to meet” (FTM) the “6,” or “+2” requirement.   
For example, below in Table 13, the baseline scenario meets the “6” requirement 
93% of the time, fails to meet the “6” requirement by one CSG 4% of the time and fails 
to meet the “6” requirement by two CSGs 3% of the time. Conversely, the baseline 
scenario meets the “+2” requirement 60% of the time, fails to meet the “+2” requirement 
by one CSG 31% of the time and fails to meet the “+2” requirement by two CSGs 9% of 
the time.  In Table 13, as in Tables 14, 15 and 16, the loss scenario produces obvious 










1. “6 to 18” 12-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
"6" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 91% 5% 4% --- ---
Baseline: 93% 4% 3% --- ---
Loss: 83% 8% 7% 2% ---
"6 to 18" 12-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "6"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 73% 18% 9% --- ---
Baseline: 60% 31% 9% --- ---
Loss: 28% 46% 22% 3% 1%
"6 to 18" 12-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 13.  Ability to meet the “6+2” requirement under the “6 to 18” 12-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule.  
 
The results in Table 14, below, are similar to those shown in Table 13.  The gain 
scenario does not produce a significant increase in meeting the “6” CSGs requirement but 
does show improvement in its ability to meet the “+2” requirement.   
 
2. “3 to 15” 12-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
"6" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 84% 12% 3% 1% ---
Baseline: 84% 10% 5% 1% ---
Loss: 68% 20% 9% 2% 1%
"3 to 15" 12-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "6"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 68% 14% 17% 1% ---
Baseline: 49% 35% 13% 3% ---
Loss: 25% 39% 28% 5% 3%
"3 to 15" 12-Month Employable State (D) - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 14.  Ability to meet the “6+2” requirement under the “3 to 15” 12-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
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In Table 15, once again, the behavior of the gain scenario mimics the results from 
the previous two model runs.  The baseline scenario’s ability to meet “6”, 96% of the 
time, is the highest percentage under each of the four training schedules.   
 
3. “6 to 21” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
"6" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 94% 3% 3% --- ---
Baseline: 96% 2% 2% --- ---
Loss: 82% 14% 3% 1% ---
"6 to 21" 15-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "6"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 87% 7% 6% --- ---
Baseline: 79% 15% 6% --- ---
Loss: 51% 31% 14% 4% ---
"6 to 21" 15-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 15.  Ability to meet the “6+2” requirement under the “6 to 21” 15-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
In Table 16, shown below, the difference (3%) between the baseline and gain 












4. “3 to 18” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
"6" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 90% 6% 4% --- ---
Baseline: 93% 3% 3% --- ---
Loss: 77% 17% 5% 1% ---
"3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State (D) - Meet "6"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 73% 19% 8% --- ---
Baseline: 67% 24% 9% --- ---
Loss: 35% 41% 19% 5% ---
"3 to 18" 15-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 16.  Ability to meet the “6+2” requirement under the “3 to 18” 15-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
The result of interest under each of these four training schedules is counter-
intuitive yet crucial to understanding the complexity of the maintenance scheduling 
problem.  The addition of one carrier to the force structure, as modeled in the gain 
scenario, does not significantly increase the ability of the training schedule to meet FRP 
requirements.  In fact, the ability of this training schedule to meet “6” CSGs decreases 
from the baseline scenario.  The ability of the schedule to meet the “+2” requirement, 
however, improves in each case. The implication being, an additional carrier in the force 
structure does not necessarily increase the ability of the fleet to meet the FRP “6+2” 
requirement. This again, points to the complexity of the problem in the first place. 
 
B.  MAINTENANCE IMPLICATIONS 
Cost ineffectiveness along with wasted human and material resources are among 
the more serious consequences of poor scheduling.  In the case of scheduling aircraft 
carriers for depot-level maintenance, poor scheduling may mean maintenance facilities 
are under used or forward-presence requirements are not met.   
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Of all the runs that were conducted with one West Coast dry-dock and two East 
Coast dry-dock facilities, with the exception of the training schedules that use the “6 to 
21” employable (D) state, each solution is driven to infeasibility at time t = 10 and t = 11.  
The cause of these infeasibilities is the East Coast dry-dock maintenance facilities. 
Although these schedules are, technically, infeasible for one two-month period, we 
anticipate the measured use of overtime and/or additional maintenance personnel will 
keep operations running close enough to schedule so as not to cause further problems.  In 
any scenario in which this 'infeasibility' occurs, maintenance schedulers should be made 
aware of the potential problem in advance so that appropriate corrective measures can be 
taken. In the tables that follow, the percentages of time that dry-dock maintenance 



















1. “6 to 18” 12-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 52% 0 77%
1 27% 1 23%
2 21% --- ---
Gain Scenario - "6 to 18" 12-Month Employable (D) State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 50% 0 77%
1 30% 1 23%
2 20% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Baseline Scenarioe - "6 to 18" 12-Month Employable (D) State
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 56% 0 77%
1 24% 1 23%
2 20% --- ---
West CoastEast Coast 
Loss Scenario - "6 to 18" 12-Month Employable (D) State
 
 
Table 17.  Percentage of time dry-dock maintenance facilities are in use under the “6 
to 18” 12-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
In the baseline scenario shown in Table 17, two of the East Coast dry-dock 
facilities are in use 20% (24 months) of the time and one dry-dock is in use 30% (36 
months) of the time for carrier maintenance.  The remaining 50% (60 months) of the time 
the dry-dock facilities are not in use for CVN maintenance. While the maintenance 
percentages associated with the East Coast dry-docks vary slightly among the three 
scenarios, the maintenance percentages associated with the West Coast dry-docks remain 
constant throughout each scenario. This suggests that maintenance is not a constraint on 
the West Coast. 
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2. “3 to 15” 12-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 47% 0 77%
1 31% 1 23%
2 22% --- ---
Gain Scenario - "3 to 15" 12-Month Employable (D) State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 53% 0 77%
1 25% 1 23%
2 22% --- ---
Baseline Scenario - "3 to 15" 12-Month Employable (D) State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 58% 0 77%
1 21% 1 23%
2 21% --- ---
West Coast




Table 18.  Percentage of time dry-dock maintenance facilities are in use under the “3 
to 15” 12-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
The results in Table 18 are fairly consistent with those received under the 
previous training schedule. As can be expected, the greater the number of aircraft carriers 
in the model, the greater the total time spent in maintenance.  Under the loss scenario, 
42% of the time is spent in maintenance; under the baseline scenario, 47% of the time is 
spent in depot-level maintenance; and under the gain scenario, 53% of the time is spent in 
maintenance.  Once again, the West Coast maintenance percentages remain the same in 




3. “6 to 21” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 47% 0 77%
1 29% 1 23%
2 24% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Gain Scenario - "6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 52% 0 77%
1 31% 1 23%
2 17% --- ---
Baseline Scenario - "6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 60% 0 77%
1 22% 1 23%
2 18% --- ---
Loss Scenario - "6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
Table 19.   Percentage of time dry-dock maintenance facilities are in use under the “6 
to 21” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
The loss scenario in Table 19 yields the highest percentage (60%) of time when 
zero dry-docks are occupied and the training schedule as a whole produces consistent 







4. “3 to 18” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 43% 0 77%
1 38% 1 23%
2 19% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Gain Scenario - "3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 50% 0 77%
1 30% 1 23%
2 20% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Baseline Scenario - "3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 55% 0 77%
1 26% 1 23%
2 19% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Loss Scenario - "3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State
 
 
Table 20.  Percentage of time dry-dock maintenance facilities are in use under the “3 
to 18” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
The interesting result in Table 20 is the baseline scenario results are exactly the 
same as the baseline scenario results in Table 17, under the “6-18” 12-month employable 
(D) state training schedule.  This suggests that lengthening the employable (D) state from 





C.  ADDING AN EAST COAST DRY-DOCK FACILITY 
Up to this point, the four scenarios were run through the model with one dry-dock 
facility available on the West Coast and two dry-dock facilities available on the East 
Coast.  The results presented below represent the ability to meet the FRP “6+2” 
requirements with a third LANTFLT dry-dock facility added to the model.  As the 15-
month training scenarios have been providing the most optimistic results, we have limited 
our analysis in this section to only the 15-month employable (D) state training schedules. 
Generally speaking, the results in Table 21 do not differ significantly from the 
results received under the same training schedule, shown in Table 15, which was 
constrained by the availability of two East Coast dry-dock facilities. This initial insight 
suggests that in the absence of a well-planned long-range maintenance schedule, the 
addition of one dry-dock facility does not affect the Fleet’s ability to meet FRP “6+2.” 
 
1. “6 to 21” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule  
"6" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 94% 3% 3% --- ---
Baseline: 95% 3% 2% --- ---
Loss: 86% 12% 1% 1% ---
"6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State (D) - Meet "6"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 88% 8% 4% --- --
Baseline: 84% 8% 8% --- ---
Loss: 48% 38% 12% 2% ---
"6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State (D) - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 21.  Ability to meet the “6+2” requirement under the “6 to 21” 15-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
In Table 22, below, the previous “trade-off” we saw between the meet “6” and 
meet “+2” requirement when an additional CSG was added to the force structure is no 
longer evident—both scenarios yield a 93% success rate.  The effect we saw earlier 
seems to have been countered by the addition of one dry-dock facility.  
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2. “3 to 18” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
"6" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 93% 5% 2% --- ---
Baseline: 93% 5% 2% --- ---
Loss: 81% 13% 5% 1% ---
"3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State (D) - Meet "6"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 78% 13% 9% --- ---
Baseline: 73% 19% 8% --- ---
Loss: 38% 42% 15% 5% ---
"3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State (D) - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 22.  Ability to meet the “6+2” requirement under the “3 to 18” 15-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
Tables 23 and 24 display the maintenance implications of adding an additional 
East Coast dry-dock facility to the model. In Table 23, the percentage of time the third 
dry-dock is in use, under each of the three scenarios is 3% or approximately four of 120 
months. Once again, as expected, the greater the number of CSGs in the force structure, 
the more time the maintenance facilities are utilized—in the loss scenario, 40% of the 
time the facilities are occupied; in the baseline scenario, 45% of the time facilities are 










3. “6 to 21” Maintenance Implications of an Additional East Coast    
Dry-dock 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 48% 0 77%
1 31% 1 23%
2 18% --- ---
3 3% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Gain Scenario - "6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 55% 0 77%
1 29% 1 23%
2 13% --- ---
3 3% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Baseline Scenario - "6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 60% 0 77%
1 25% 1 23%
2 12% --- ---
3 3% --- ---
East Coast West Coast
Loss Scenario - "6 to 21" 15-Month Employable State
 
 
Table 23.  Percentage of time dry-dock maintenance facilities are in use under the “6 
to 21” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
In Table 24, the relative percentages of time spent in zero or one dry-docks under 
each training plan, in each scenario, remains approximately the same as the scenarios run 
with two dry-docks.  The primary difference is observed between the distribution of time 




4. “3 to 18” Maintenance Implications of an Additional East Coast    
Dry-dock 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 54% 0 77%
1 25% 1 23%
2 11% --- ---
3 10% --- ---
Gain Scenario - "3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 51% 0 77%
1 38% 1 23%
2 5% --- ---
3 6% --- ---
Baseline Scenario - "3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
# of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time # of Dry Docks Occupied % of Time 
0 62% 0 77%
1 22% 1 23%
2 10% --- ---
3 6% --- ---
Loss Scenario - "3 to 18" 15-Month Employable State
East Coast West Coast
 
 
Table 24.  Percentage of time dry-dock maintenance facilities are in use under the “3 
to 18” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
D.  MEETING “5+2” FRP 
We have demonstrated that the baseline “6 to 21” 15-month employable (D) state 
training plan meets the “6” requirement 96% of the time and the “+2” requirement 79% 
of the time.  If we change the FRP requirement to “5+2” and maintain one dry-dock 
facility on the West Coast and two dry-dock facilities on the East Coast does our ability 
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to meet this requirement change significantly? The results in Tables 25 and 26 were 
produced in the model running under the “5+2” requirement. 
The results received from increasing the employable (D) state duration to 15 
months are shown in Table 25.  In this case, in the baseline scenario, we meet the “5” 
requirement 98% of the time and the “+2” requirement 97% of the time.   
 
1. “6 to 21” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
"5" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 98% 2% --- --- ---
Baseline: 98% 2% --- --- ---
Loss: 96% 3% 1% --- ---
"6 to 21" 15-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "5"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 97% 3% --- --- ---
Baseline: 97% 3% --- --- ---
Loss: 86% 11% 3% --- ---
"6 to 21" 15-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 25.  Ability to meet the “5+2” requirement under the “6 to 21” 15-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
The results for the “6 to 18” 12-month employable (D) state training schedule 
scenario under the “6+2” requirement were 93% and 60%, respectively.  As shown in 
Table 26, when the requirement was lowered to “5+2”, the ability to meet “6” increases 
slightly but the ability to meet “+2” jumps substantially.  In fact, the ability to meet “+2” 







2. “6 to 18” 12-Month Employable (D) State Training Schedule 
"5" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 96% 4% --- --- ---
Baseline: 96% 4% --- --- ---
Loss: 95% 4% 1% --- ---
"6 to 18" 12-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "5"
 
 
"+2" FTM "1" FTM "2" FTM "3" FTM "4"
Gain: 94% 6% --- --- ---
Baseline: 94% 6% --- --- ---
Loss: 78% 16% 6% --- ---
"6 to 18" 12-Month Employable (D) State - Meet "+2"
 
 
Table 26.  Ability to meet the “5+2” requirement under the “6 to 18” 12-Month 
Employable (D) State Training Schedule. 
 
When we increase the employable (D) state duration to 15 months and drop the 
surge requirement to “5+2” both respective percentages increase.  The most significant 
result that stems from this portion of the analysis is displayed in Figure 7 below.  The 2% 
of the time—approximately 3 out of 120 months— that we fail to meet “5” CSGs occurs 
at time t = 1 (Aug 04), t = 2 (Sep 04), and t = 3 (Oct 04).  In other words, beginning in 
November, 2004, we are able to meet the “5” CSG requirement indisputably.  We are 
able to meet the “5+2” requirement indisputably at time t = 31, i.e., February 2007.  
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Figure 7.    30 Months of FRP—how well do we meet “5+2”?  The results above were 
produced running the “6 to 21” 15-Month Employable (D) State Training 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Optimally scheduling ships’ long-term maintenance and training cycles is a 
complex decision making process that involves the allocation of a scarce resource, in this 
case Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs), in a manner that maximizes their employment 
availability.  This process is essential to providing U.S. Naval Force capabilities as 
required under the 2003 Fleet Readiness Plan (FRP) and Fleet Readiness Training Plan 
(FRTP) construct. Manual enumeration of such schedules is tedious, time-consuming, 
and severely limited in its ability to explore the long-term affects of policy change. This 
work quantifies the ability to meet FRP and increase the percentage of time an Aircraft 
Carrier Strike Group (CSG) is available for employment.  It demonstrates that over the 
long-term, with current maintenance plans and restrictions, we cannot meet the FRP 
“6+2” requirement 100% of the time. If one lengthens the employable (D) state to 15 
months, the percentage of time one can meet the “6+2” requirement increases. Under the 
“6 to 21” 15-month employable (D) state training plan, “6+2”can be met, undeniably, by 
October 2009. 
If one increases the employable (D) state to 15 months and in addition, decreases 
the FRP requirement to “5+2,” these forces are available, unquestionably, by February 
2007. The benefit of this analysis is that we propose alternative solutions to meeting the 
FRP “6+2” requirement and can quantify the affects of the associated policy changes. 
Even though this research concentrated on maintenance scheduling of aircraft 
carriers, similar research conducted on the maintenance scheduling of the carrier air wing 
(CVW) promises to hold significant insight.  A close look at the CVW maintenance cycle 
may provide additional insights that affect the employability of the CSG force.  
Additionally, a similar look into the training and maintenance cycles for Expeditionary 
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APPENDIX A. MAINTENANCE TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
The following definitions are quoted from Enclosure (2) of OPNAV NOTICE 
4700, Representative Intervals, Durations, Maintenance Cycles, and Repair Mandays for 
Depot Level Maintenance Availabilities of U.S. Navy Ships. 
1. Docking Planned Incremental Availability (DPIA). A labor-intensive 
availability, of less than a year duration, for aircraft carriers in an 
Incremental Maintenance Program. Maintenance and modernization are 
accomplished. Aircraft carriers assigned to Incremental Maintenance 
Programs are maintained through PIAs and DPIAs in lieu of overhauls. 
2. Docking Selected Restricted Availabilities (DSRA). An SRA expanded 
in scope to include maintenance and modernization that require dry-
docking. 
3. Duration. The period from the start of an availability to its completion. 
4. Engineering Operating Cycle (EOC). This maintenance philosophy 
keeps ships in an acceptable material condition while sustaining or 
increasing the operational availability of the ship. Earmarked by a 
structured engineered approach for ship maintenance while minimizing the 
time spent in depot-level availabilities.  Major elements of the 
maintenance strategy include: 
• Periodic inspections of selected systems and equipment to identify 
and document necessary repair requirements and material 
condition trends. 
• Periodic maintenance tasks to be accomplished at specified times 
during the ship’s life cycle. 
• Scheduled intra-cycle Intermediate Maintenance Availabilities 
(IMAVs), Drydocking SRAs (DSRAs), SRAs, and ROHs to 
accomplish the maintenance and modernizations required to 
sustain or improve the material condition of the ship. 
• Extensive modernization to maintain and upgrade the ship class 
war fighting capability. 
5. Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA). A DSRA 
expanded in scope to include maintenance and modernization that cannot 
be accomplished in a DSRA. 
6. Inactivation Availability (INAC). An availability assigned to prepare a 
ship for inactivation or disposal.  The scope of work depends on the 
planned disposition of the ship. 
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7. (Incremental Maintenance Program IMP). A maintenance philosophy 
that keeps aircraft carriers in an acceptable material condition through a 
series of incremental depot maintenance actions. Types of availabilities 
under this maintenance philosophy include PIAs and DPIAs. 
8. Incremental Selected Restricted Availability (ISRA). An availability 
for continuous accomplishment of industrial maintenance and selected 
modernization.  A nearly continuous availability period assigned to 
forward deployed aircraft carriers, mine warfare ships and AFG 3. 
9. Interval. The period from the completion of the prior scheduled depot 
availability to the start of the next scheduled depot availability. 
10. Maintenance Cycle. The period of time, which starts after the completion 
of a ship’s overhaul (or docking availability, when no overhaul 
availabilities are included in the maintenance plan) and ends after 
completion of the next overhaul or docking availability. For new 
construction or conversion ships, the maintenance cycle starts after the 
completion of the post shakedown availability or as defined in the ship’s 
class maintenance plan. 
11. Overhaul. A major availability normally exceeding six months duration to 
accomplish maintenance and modernization. Program Managers 
frequently use terms such as: 
• Regular, Complex, or Engineered Overhaul availability (ROH, 
COH, or EOH) to describe or identify planning and execution 
differences among overhaul availabilities of different ship classes. 
• Refueling complex or engineered refueling overhaul availability 
(RFOH, RCOH or ERO) to describe or identify fundamental 
planning and execution differences among overhaul availabilities 
of different nuclear powered ship classes during which the reactor 
is also refueled. 
12. Planned Incremental Availability (PIA). A labor-intensive availability, 
of less than six months, for aircraft carriers in an Incremental Maintenance 
Program. Maintenance and modernization are accomplished.  Aircraft 
carriers assigned to Incremental Maintenance Programs are maintained 
through PIAs and DPIAs in lieu of overhauls. 
13. Post Shakedown Availability (PSA). An availability assigned to newly 
built activated or converted ships upon completion of post-delivery 
shakedown. PSAs will be scheduled so they are completed no later than 
the end of the Shipbuilding and Conversion Navy (SCN) obligation work 
limiting date which is the date on which SCN funding and work authority 
terminates. Work performed shall normally include correction of defects 
noted during shakedown correction of deficiencies remaining from the 
acceptance trials and performance of class modifications remaining from 
the new construction activation or conversion period. 
14. Progressive Maintenance (PROG). This maintenance philosophy is 
designed to support ships with reduced manning, limited organizational 
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level maintenance, and operational tempos that limit availability periods. 
It is also designed to sustain a high level of readiness and increase the 
ship’s availability for required operations. Ships with reduced manning are 
designed for major component removal and replacement. To compensate 
for the reduced manning and other shipboard maintenance off-ship 
component refurbishment is done by intermediate and depot level 
activities.  This concept requires maintenance and logistic support systems 
significantly different from those required for conventionally manned 
surface ships. Major elements of the maintenance strategy include:  
• Engineered maintenance planning, 
• Progressive overhaul, 
• Upgrading of maintenance tasks from ship’s force to the 
Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA), 
• Modular replacement, 
• Dedicated material support and increased stock-level procurement. 
15. Repair Mandays. Those type commander maintenance mandays typically 
accomplished by the executing activity to satisfactorily complete the type 
of availability indicated. Repair mandays include Title D and F alteration 
mandays normally accomplished during the availability.  Repair mandays 
do not include mandays from concurrent intermediate level maintenance 
availabilities. 
16. Selected Restricted Availability (SRA). A short labor-intensive 
industrial period assigned to ships in Progressive or Engineered Operating 
Cycle Maintenance Programs for the accomplishment of maintenance and 
selected modernization.  Ships assigned to Progressive Maintenance 
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APPENDIX B. REPRESENTATIVE INTERVALS, DURATIONS, 
MAINTENANCE CYCLES, AND REPAIR MANDAYS FOR DEPOT 




A. KITTY HAWK (CV 63) is a one-of-a kind forward-deployed carrier.  For 
ISRA availabilities from FY 04 to INACT the maintenance requirement will decrease in 
a stepped function, as follows: FY 04: 90K MDs, FY 05: 80K MDs, FY 06: 70K MDs, 
FY 07: 60K MDs, FY08: 25K MDs. 
B. CVN 65 has its own specifically designed Incremental Maintenance Program 
(IMP).  It closely follows the IMP for the CVN 68 Class but uses different names for the 
availabilities; e.g., ESRA and EDSRA.  This naming convention will continue until the 
end of CVN 65’s service life. 
C. NIMITZ Class CVNs have transitioned to the Incremental Maintenance 
Program. The RCOH will normally coincide with the fourth DPIA depending on the 
operational tempo and the actual duration of earlier depot level availabilities, which 
directly affect the rate of fuel depletion.  A material condition assessment is required four 















APPENDIX C. AGGREGATE CARRIER MAINTENANCE 
SCHEDULE AS OF 12 MAY 2004 
Hull Type Hull ID Avail Start Date Comp Date Curve Ovhlyard Homeport CFcst
CONNIE CV  64 IA 9/29/2003 8/31/2004 PU0229 PUGET SD    38500 45347
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV  67 SRA 1/6/2003 11/13/2003 PU0B63 PUGET MAYPT 103665 102000
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV  67 ESRA 1/6/2003 11/15/2003 SJACK 0 217000
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV  67 RAV 5/2/2005 6/24/2005 000548 SJACK 50000 50000
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV  67 COH 6/23/2005 8/18/2006 NO0222 NORVA MAYPT 369108 374513
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV  67 ROH 7/1/2005 8/16/2006 000427 SPORT 49948 50000
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV  67 SRA 1/14/2008 7/11/2008 SJACK 49700 49700
USS JOHN F. KENNEDY CV  67 SRA 3/31/2010 9/30/2010 SJACK 49700 49700
USS ENTERPRISE CVN 65 ESRA 9/8/2004 6/7/2005 SNEWS 239405 241300
USS ENTERPRISE CVN 65 RA 10/4/2004 2/25/2005 NO0B47 NORVA NORVA 15000 11024
USS ENTERPRISE CVN 65 ESRA 2/12/2007 8/10/2007 SNEWS 241300 241300
USS ENTERPRISE CVN 65 EDSR 7/12/2008 7/12/2009 SNEWS 416200 416200
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 RA 2/23/2004 6/23/2004 NO0B36 NORVA SD    11000 10986
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 PIA 2/23/2004 8/23/2004 PU0240 PUGET SD    131835 128800
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 PIA 2/23/2004 8/23/2004 SSD 65176 77600
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 PIA 3/1/2006 9/1/2006 PU0240 PUGET SD    128860 126000
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 PIA 3/1/2006 9/1/2006 SSD 74000 74000
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 DPIA 6/16/2008 5/1/2009 PU0B78 PUGET SD    325794 263900
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 DPIA 6/16/2008 5/1/2009 SPUGT 44919 45000
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 PIA 8/2/2010 2/4/2011 PU0B42 PUGET SD    145241 123500
USS NIMITZ CVN 68 PIA 8/2/2010 2/4/2011 SSD 89082 90000
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69 RFOH 4/7/2004 8/21/2004 000521 SNEWS 0 67063
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69 RFOH 8/7/2004 10/29/2004 000522 SNEWS 0 37231
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69 PSA 3/1/2005 7/1/2005 SNEWS 24000 24000
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69 SRA 3/1/2005 7/1/2005 SNEWS 77900 77900
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69 PIA 7/12/2007 1/11/2008 NO0240 NORVA NORVA 157361 158744
USS DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER CVN 69 PIA 10/6/2009 4/4/2010 NO0240 NORVA NORVA 149568 173800
USS CARL VINSON CVN 70 RFOH 11/14/2005 11/14/2008 SNEWS 0 252600
USS CARL VINSON CVN 70 SRA 2/16/2009 6/19/2009 SNEWS 81000 81000
USS CARL VINSON CVN 70 PSA 2/16/2009 6/19/2009 SNEWS 15000 15000
USS CARL VINSON CVN 70 PIA 2/28/2011 9/2/2011 PU0B42 PUGET BREM  182898 99300
USS CARL VINSON CVN 70 PIA 2/28/2011 9/2/2011 SPUGT 33000 33000
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVN 71 RAV 2/2/2004 12/17/2004 000685 SPORT 0 78000
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVN 71 DPIA 2/3/2004 12/17/2004 NO0004 NORVA NORVA 316800 252606
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVN 71 RFOH 10/1/2005 8/2/2012 000524 SNEWS 2960000 2960000
USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT CVN 71 PIA 2/13/2007 8/10/2007 NO0240 NORVA NORVA 174826 191163
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 DPIA 6/23/2003 5/7/2004 PU0004 PUGET EVRT  373185 308500
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 DPIA 6/23/2003 5/7/2004 SPUGT 8431 95000
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 PIA 9/4/2006 3/2/2007 PU0240 PUGET EVRT  215605 176925
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 PIA 9/4/2006 3/2/2007 SPUGT 29590 30000
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 PIA 1/12/2009 7/17/2009 PU0240 PUGET EVRT  198259 173000
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 PIA 1/12/2009 7/17/2009 SPUGT 30000 30000
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 DPIA 1/10/2011 12/23/2011 PU0B17 PUGET EVRT  358401 146200
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 DPIA 1/10/2011 12/23/2011 000544 SPUGT 50000 50000
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN CVN 72 RFOH 10/1/2012 11/18/2016 SNEWS 0 296000
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVN 73 PIA 2/21/2003 8/15/2003 NO0A38 NORVA NORVA 184164 182488
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVN 73 DPIA 1/10/2005 11/22/2005 000428 SNEWS 342900 342900
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVN 73 RAV 1/18/2005 7/15/2005 NORVA 5000
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVN 73 PIA 9/19/2007 3/21/2008 NO0240 NORVA NORVA 184835 208786
USS GEORGE WASHINGTON CVN 73 PIA 4/29/2010 10/29/2010 NO0240 NORVA NORVA 184036 201400
USS JOHN C. STENNIS CVN 74 DPIA 2/14/2005 12/20/2005 PU0004 PUGET SD    248420 256315
USS JOHN C. STENNIS CVN 74 DPIA 2/14/2005 12/20/2005 SPUGT 0 40000
USS JOHN C. STENNIS CVN 74 PIA 10/29/2007 4/29/2008 PU0240 PUGET SD    162420 140800
USS JOHN C. STENNIS CVN 74 PIA 10/29/2007 4/29/2008 SPUGT 32921 33000
USS JOHN C. STENNIS CVN 74 PIA 2/1/2010 8/6/2010 PU0B60 PUGET SD    175785 140800
USS JOHN C. STENNIS CVN 74 PIA 2/1/2010 8/6/2010 SPUGT 45000 45000
USS HARRY S. TRUMAN CVN 75 PIA 8/20/2003 2/18/2004 NO0A45 NORVA NORVA 145022 140264
USS HARRY S. TRUMAN CVN 75 RAV 8/20/2003 2/16/2004 SPORT 0 36000
USS HARRY S. TRUMAN CVN 75 DPIA 3/28/2006 2/15/2007 NO0004 NORVA NORVA 233042 234824
USS HARRY S. TRUMAN CVN 75 PIA 11/17/2008 5/19/2009 NO0240 NORVA NORVA 155611 173800
USS HARRY S. TRUMAN CVN 75 PIA 2/11/2011 8/13/2011 NO0240 NORVA NORVA 163612 173800
USS RONALD REAGAN CVN 76 PSA 12/1/2003 5/2/2004 SNEWS 0 18400
USS RONALD REAGAN CVN 76 SRA 12/1/2003 5/2/2004 SNEWS 0 85000
USS RONALD REAGAN CVN 76 PIA 4/2/2007 9/28/2007 PU0240 PUGET SD    113975 112580
USS RONALD REAGAN CVN 76 PIA 4/2/2007 9/28/2007 SSD 65000 65000
USS RONALD REAGAN CVN 76 PIA 8/3/2009 2/5/2010 PU0240 PUGET SD    114953 98130
USS RONALD REAGAN CVN 76 PIA 8/3/2009 2/5/2010 SSD 61965 65000
TBD CVN 77 PSA 10/20/2008 3/1/2009 SNEWS 35386 36500
TBD CVN 77 SRA 10/20/2008 3/1/2009 SNEWS 78483 81000
TBD CVN 77 PIA 2/1/2011 8/1/2011 PU0B42 PUGET NORVA 116117 141000
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APPENDIX D. GENCOLS.C 
The following code was written in C and generates a specified number of columns 






#define CYCLES 7 
#define STATES 7 
 
/*Generate columns for set-partition formulation of 
  carrier scheduling problem*/ 
 
/*Column coefficients for carrier k, column c, will be in .csv format 







representing the gams TABLE format: 
 TABLE coefs(c,k,t,s) 
             E     D     Mwp   Mwd   Mep   Med    P 
  k1.c1.t1   1     0     0     0     0     0      0 
  k1.c1.t2   0     1     0     0     0     0      0 
  ... 
 
Where a 1 indicates that carrier k is in state (E,D,Mwp,Mwd,Mep,Med,P) 
in month t. 
 
states 0-6 
0=E=emergency surge, 1=D=deployed, 2-5 =Mxx =maintenance (w=west, 
e=east, p=pierside, d=drydock), 
6=P=prep (mandatory training) 
*/ 
 
/*Also creates summary output file, summ.dat, which 
  gives the deployment durations for each column, for each CSG. 
  This allows us to look up the solutions and figure out the 
  deployment and maintenance schedule for each CSG.*/ 
 
 
int main(int argc, char **argv) { 
  int kk,cc,tt; 
  int k,c,t,s,ss,i,ii; 
  int *durS,*dlow,*dup; 
  int sdur; 
 
  FILE *infile; 
  FILE *outfile; 
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  FILE *summfile; 
 
  if(argc != 2){ 
    printf("Usage: %s <columns>\n",argv[0]); 
    return 1; 
  } 
 
  cc=atoi(argv[1]); 
  kk=12; 
  tt=120; 
 
  durS=(int *)malloc(STATES*CYCLES*sizeof(int)); 
  dlow=(int *)malloc(CYCLES*sizeof(int)); 
  dup =(int *)malloc(CYCLES*sizeof(int)); 
  /*durS[i*4+s] is duration of state s (0-6) in cycle i (0-6)*/ 
  infile=fopen("durations.csv","r"); 
 
 /*format of durations.csv is 
   e1,dlow1,dup1,mwp1,mwd1,mep1,med1,p1 
   e2,dlow2,dup2,mwp2,mwd2,mep2,med2,p2 
   ... 
 




  outfile=fopen("cols.dat","w"); 
  summfile=fopen("summ.dat","w"); 
 
  fprintf(outfile,"dummy,dummy,dummy,E,D,Mwp,Mwd,Mep,Med,P\n"); 
  for(k=2;k<=kk;k++){  /*skip k1=KHK*/ 
    for(i=0;i<CYCLES;i++){ 
      
fscanf(infile,"%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d\n",&durS[i*STATES],&dlow[i],&dup
[i], 
        
&durS[i*STATES+2],&durS[i*STATES+3],&durS[i*STATES+4],&durS[i*STATES+5]
,&durS[i*STATES+6]); 
      printf("%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d\n",durS[i*STATES],dlow[i],dup[i], 
        
durS[i*STATES+2],durS[i*STATES+3],durS[i*STATES+4],durS[i*STATES+5],dur
S[i*STATES+6]); 
      durS[i*STATES+1]=dup[i]; 
    } 
    for(c=1;c<=cc;c++){ 
      i=0; 
      s=0; 
      while(durS[s]==0) /*find first nonzero state duration (guaranteed 
to occur in cycle 0)*/ 
        s++; 
      sdur=1; 
      for(t=1;t<=tt;t++){ 
        fprintf(outfile,"k%d,c%d,t%d",k,c,t); 
        for(ss=0;ss<STATES;ss++) 
          if(s==ss) 
            fprintf(outfile,",1"); 
          else 
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            fprintf(outfile,",0"); 
        fprintf(outfile,"\n"); 
        if(sdur==durS[i*STATES+s]) { 
          if(s==STATES-1){ 
            i++; 
            s=0; 
          } 
          else{ 
            s++; 
            while(durS[i*STATES+s]==0) 
              s++; 
          } 
          sdur=1; 
        } 
        else 
          sdur++; 
      } 
      fprintf(summfile,"k%d,c%d",k,c); 
      for(i=0;i<CYCLES;i++) 
        fprintf(summfile,",%d",durS[i*STATES+1]); 
      fprintf(summfile,"\n"); 
      /*next column: increment (or reset) deployment durations 
appropriately*/ 
      /*find first deployment longer than min deployment for that 
cycle*/ 
      for(i=0;durS[i*STATES+1]<=dlow[i] && i<CYCLES;i++) 
        ; 
      /*decrement that deployment*/ 
      if(i<CYCLES) 
        durS[i*STATES+1]--; 
      /*reset deployments in earlier cycles to maximum durations*/ 
      for(ii=0;ii<i;ii++) 
        durS[ii*STATES+1]=dup[ii]; 
    } 
  } 
  fclose(infile); 
  fclose(outfile); 
  fclose(summfile); 
  return 0; 











































APPENDIX E. DURATIONS.CSV FILE 
The following durations.comma-separated-values (CSV) file is used as input data 
to the scheduling model.  This data corresponds exactly to the suggested maintenance 
schedule data shown in Table 10. 
0 1 1 0 0 0 9 3
3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
3 6 21 0 0 7 4 5
3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
3 6 21 0 0 7 4 5
3 6 21 0 0 0 6 3
0 9 9 0 0 8 8 5
3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
3 6 21 0 0 8 4 5
3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
3 6 21 0 0 0 3 3
3 6 21 0 0 8 4 5
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
3 6 21 0 6 0 0 3
3 6 21 7 4 0 0 5
3 6 21 0 6 0 0 3
3 6 21 0 6 0 0 3
3 6 21 7 4 0 0 5
3 6 21 0 6 0 0 3  
Table 27.  Durations.CSV file for the Suggested 27-Month Maintenance Schedule 
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